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Abstract. We present a possible kind of generalization of the notion of ordered pairs of cyclic maps
and coupled fixed points and its application in modelling of equilibrium in oligopoly markets. We
have obtained sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of coupled fixed in complete
metric spaces. We illustrate one possible application of the results by building a pragmatic model
on competition in oligopoly markets. To achieve this goal, we use an approach based on studying
the response functions of each market participant, thus making it possible to address both Cournot
and Bertrand industrial structures with unified formal method. We show that whenever the response
functions of the two players are identical, then the equilibrium will be attained at equal levels
of production and equal prices. The response functions approach makes it also possible to take
into consideration different barriers to entry. By fitting to the response functions rather than the
profit maximization of the payoff functions problem we alter the classical optimization problem to
a problem of coupled fixed points, which has the benefit that considering corner optimum, corner
equilibrium and convexity condition of the payoff function can be skipped.
Keywords: variational principle, coupled fixed points, oligopoly market, market equilibrium.
1 Introduction
Ekeland proved a variational principle in 1972. In a series of articles, he enriches the
results. Later he presented a more concise proof [15], which technique we will use. In
the same article [15], various applications of the variational principle in different fields
of mathematics are presented. Ekeland’s variational principle has many applications and
generalizations [3,6,10,26,27]. It is well known that fixed point theorems and variational
principles are closely related [7, 15]. A very recent publication, which presents probably
the best known generalization of Caristi’s results, is [30]. Many well-known results are
obtained as consequences of the main results from [30].
Fixed point theorems initiated by Banach’s contraction principle has proved to be
a powerful tool in nonlinear analysis. We cannot mention all kinds of generalizations
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of Banach’s contraction principle. One direction for generalization of it is the notion of
coupled fixed points [17], where mixed monotone maps in partially ordered by a cone
Banach spaces are investigated. Later this idea was developed for mixed monotone maps
in partially ordered metric spaces [18]. It is impossible to summarize all generalizations
of the ideas of coupled fixed points for mixed monotone maps in partially ordered metric
spaces. The investigation on the subject continuous as seen [1,19,22,29], which is far from
exhausting the most recent results. Another kind of maps considered in partially ordered
complete metric spaces are for monotone maps without the mixed monotone property
[13, 20].
Let us mention that Ekeland’s variational principle holds for any l.s.c. maps T :
X×X → R, provided thatX is a partially ordered complete metric space. Unfortunately,
when investigating contraction type of maps F : X × X → X satisfying the mixed
monotone property in a partially ordered complete metric space X × X the contraction
conditions holds only for part of the points (x, y), (u, v) ∈ X × X . Thus we cannot
apply Ekeland’s variational principle as it is done in [15]. A similar approach was used
in [27], where variational principles in partially ordered metric spaces were obtained and
used to investigated problems, otherwise impossible to solve with the known variational
principles.
In [33], the problem for generalizing Ekeland’s variational principle on classes of
subsets of partially ordered complete metric space X ×X , which need not to be compact
or even closed is obtained. Number of applications of the main result are presented in [33],
where existence and uniqueness are proven for well-known results [4,18] with the help of
the generalized variational principle, and some new theorems are obtained.
The considered maps are of the kind F : X × X → X , and we are searching for
a coupled fixed point, i.e. (x, y) ∈ X ×X be such that x = F (x, y) and y = F (y, x). As
it is shown in a number of articles, there holds x = y. A generalization of coupled fixed
or best proximity points (x, y) when x 6= y is presented in [14].
Following [17, 18], let X be a set, and let 4 be a partial order in X , then (X,4) is
called a partially ordered set. We call two elements x, y ∈ X comparable if either x 4 y
or y 4 x. We denote x < y if y 4 x. We say that x ≺ if x 4 y, but x 6= y. Let (X, ρ) be
a metric space with a partial order 4, then the triple (X, ρ,4) is called a partially ordered
metric space. Ran and Reurings in [28] initiate the fixed point theory in partially ordered
metric spaces.
Definition 1. Let (Z,4) be a partially ordered andX,Y ⊆ Z, let F : X×Y → X and f :
X × Y → Y . The ordered couple (F, f) is said to have the mixed monotone property if
(i) for any x1, x2, y ∈ X such that x1 4 x2, there holds F (x1, y) 4 F (x2, y), and
(ii) for any y1, y2, x ∈ X such that y1 4 y2, there holds f(x, y1) < f(x, y2).
If X ≡ Y , and F ≡ f , we get the definition from [17, 18].
Definition 2. Let (Z,4) be a partially ordered and X,Y ⊆ Z. Let F : X × Y → X and
f : X × Y → Y . An ordered pair (x, y) ∈ X ×X is called coupled fixed point of (F, f)
if x = F (x, y) and y = f(x, y).
http://www.journals.vu.lt/nonlinear-analysis
A variational principle, coupled fixed points and market equilibrium 171
If X ≡ Y and F ≡ f , we get the definition from [17, 18].
Let (X, ρ,4) be a partially ordered complete metric space. We endow the product
spaceX×X with the following partial order (u, v)4(x, y), provided that x<u and y4v
holds simultaneously and with the following metric d((x, y), (u, v)) = ρ(x, u) + ρ(y, v)
for (x, y), (u, v) ∈ X ×X .
Every where for a partially ordered metric space (X, ρ,4), we will consider the
product space (X×X, d,4) endowed with the mentioned above partial order and metric.
Let (X, ρ) be a metric space. Following [6], an extended real valued function T :
X → (−∞,+∞] on X is called lower semicontinuous (for short l.s.c.) if {x ∈ X:
f(x) > a} is an open set for each a ∈ (−∞,+∞]. Equivalently, T is l.s.c. if and only if,
at any point x0 ∈ X , there holds lim infx→x0 f(x) > f(x0). A function T is called to be
proper function, provided that T 6≡ +∞.
2 Variational principle
Just to fit some of the formulas in the text field, we will use the notation u = (u(1), u(2)) ∈
Z × Z, and for any u ∈ Z × Z, let us denote u = (u(2), u(1)).
Theorem 1. Let (Z, ρ,4) be a partially ordered complete metric space, (Z × Z, d,4),
X,Y ⊆ Z and F : X × Y → X and f : X × Y → Y be a continuous maps with the
mixed monotone property. Let




x(1), x(2)) ∈ X × Y : x(1) 4 F (x) and x(2) < f(x)
}
6= ∅.
Let T : X × Y → R ∪ {+∞} be a proper, l.s.c., bounded from below function. Let
ε > 0 be arbitrary chosen and fixed, and let u0 ∈ V ×U be an ordered pair such that the
inequality
T (u0) 6 inf
V×U
T (v) + ε (1)
holds. Then there exists an ordered pair x ∈ V × U such that
(i) T (x) 6 infu∈V×U T (u);
(ii) d(x, u0) 6 1;
(iii) For every w ∈ V × U different from x ∈ V × U , the following inequality holds:
T (w) > T (x)− εd(w, v).
Proof. Let us define inductively a sequence of ordered pairs {un}∞n=0 ⊂ X × Y starting
with the pair u0 ∈ V × U that satisfies (1).
Suppose that we have already chosen un ∈ V × U . There holds either:
(a) For every ordered pair w 6= un, w ∈ V × U , holds the inequality T (w) >
T (un)− εd(w, un); or
(b) There exists w 6= un, w ∈ V × U , so that there holds the inequality
T (w) 6 T (un)− εd(w, un). (2)
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If case (a) holds, we choose un+1 = un. In case of (b), let us denote by Sn ⊂ V × U the









We claim that, in both cases, {un}∞n=0 is a Cauchy sequence.
Indeed, if case (a) ever occurs, the sequence is stationary starting from some index n.
If case (a) does not occur for any index n ∈ N, then it should be case (b) for all indexes
n ∈ N. Therefore, by (2) we have the inequalities
d(uk, uk+1) 6 T (uk)− T (uk+1)








T (uk)− T (uk+1)
)
= T (un)− T (up). (4)
From the inequality
T (un+1) 6 T (un)− εd(un, un+1) < T (un)
it follows that the sequence {T (un)}∞n=0 is a decreasing one and bounded from below (by
infv∈V×U T (v)). Hence it is convergent. So the right-hand side in (4) goes to zero when
n and p go to infinity simultaneously. Consequently, {un}∞n=0 is a Cauchy sequence.
Since (Z × Z, d) is a complete metric space (because (Z, ρ) is complete), it follows that




n )}∞n=0 converges to some x = (x(1), x(2)) ∈ Z×Z.
We claim that (x(1), x(2)) ∈ V × U and satisfies (i), (ii) and (iii).

















(i) By construction the sequence {T (un)}∞n=0 is monotonously decreasing and con-
sequently using the l.s.c. of T we get T (x) 6 limn→+∞ T (un) 6 T (u0), and conse-
quently (i) holds.
(ii) Let us put n = 0 in (4), i.e.
εd(u0, up) 6 T (u0)− T (up) 6 T (u0)− inf
v∈V×U
T (v) 6 ε.
Letting p to infinity in the last inequality, we get εd(u0, x) = limp→+∞ εd(u0, up) 6 ε,
i.e. d(x, u) 6 1.
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(iii) Let us suppose that (iii) were not true for all w ∈ V × U . Therefore we can
choose w 6= x, w ∈ V × U , so that
T (w) 6 T (x)− εd(w, x) < T (x). (5)
Letting p→ +∞ in (4), we obtain
εd(un, x) 6 T (un)− T (x). (6)
From (5) and (6) we get the chain of inequalities
T (w) 6 T (x)− εd(w, x) 6 T (un)− εd(un, x)− εd(x,w)
= T (un)− ε
(
d(un, x) + d(x,w)
)
6 T (un)− εd(un, w),
and thus w ∈ Sn for all n ∈ N. From (3) we have
2T (un+1)− T (un) 6 inf
Sn
F 6 T (w) (7)








T (un) = l 6 T (w). (8)
Since T is l.s.c., we have the inequality
T (x) 6 lim
n→+∞
T (un) = l, (9)
and thus (8) and (9) imply that T (x) 6 T (w), a contradiction with (5).
3 Coupled fixed points
We will need the next observation that is used in [4,11,18], but not stated as a proposition.
Proposition 1. Let (Z,4) be a partially ordered set, X,Y ⊆ Z and F : X × Y → X ,
f : X × Y → Y be an ordered pair of map with the mixed monotone property. Let
(x, y) ∈ X × Y satisfies the inequalities x 4 F (x, y), y < f(x, y), and let us put
u = F (x, y) and v = f(x, y). Then there hold u 4 F (u, v), v < f(u, v), u < x and
v 4 y.
Proof. By the definition of (u, v) ∈ X × Y there hold x 4 F (x, y) = u and y <
f(x, y) = v. From the assumption that (F, f) satisfies the mixed monotone property we
get the inequalities
F (u, v) < F (x, v) < F (x, y) = u
and
f(u, v) 4 f(u, y) 4 f(x, y) = v.
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Let (Z,4) be a partially ordered set,X,Y ⊆ Z andF : X×Y → X , f : X×Y → Y .
Following [18], for any (ξ0, η0) ∈ X × Y , we will consider the sequence {ξn, ηn}∞n=0
defined by ξn = F (ξn−1, ηn−1) = Fn(ξ0, η0) and ηn = f(ξn−1, ηn−1) = fn(ξ0, η0) for
n ∈ N.
Proposition 2. Let (Z,4) be a partially ordered set, X,Y ⊆ Z and F : X × Y → X ,
f : X × Y → Y be an ordered pair of maps with the mixed monotone property. Let
(x, y) ∈ X × Y be a coupled fixed point, i.e. x = F (x, y), y = f(x, y), and let (ξ0, η0)
be comparable with (x, y). Then (ξn, ηn) is comparable with (x, y) = (F (x, y), f(x, y))
and (ηn, ξn) is comparable with (y, x) = (f(x, y), F (x, y)).
Proof. If (ξ0, η0) is comparable with (x, y), then there holds either ξ0 4 x and η0 < y
or ξ0 < x and η0 4 y. Let us assume that there holds the second one (i.e. ξ0 < x and
η0 4 y). Using the mixed monotone property, we get
ξ1 = F (ξ0, η0) < F (x, η0) < F (x, y) = x
and
η1 = f(ξ0, η0) 4 f(ξ0, y) 4 f(x, y) = y.
Therefore (ξ1, η1) < (x, y) = (F (x, y), f(x, y)). We can get by induction that
ξn = F (ξn−1, ηn−1) < F (x, ηn−1) < F (x, y) = x
and
ηn = f(ξn−1, ηn−1) 4 f(ξn−1, y) 4 f(x, y) = y.
Consequently, (ξn, ηn) is comparable with (x, y) and
(ξn, ηn) < (x, y) =
(
F (x, y), f(x, y)
)
.
If there holds the first case (i.e. ξ0 4 x and η0 < y), we can get in a similar fashion
that there hold ξn 4 x and ηn < y and thus(
F (x, y), f(x, y)
)
= (x, y) < (ξn, ηn).
Therefore (ξn, ηn) is comparable with (x, y) = (F (x, y), F (y, x)) in both cases.
We will need the result from [25] that, in a partially ordered space, any element has an
lower or an upper bound is equivalent to, for every two element, there exists an element,
which is comparable with both of them.
Theorem 2. Let (Z, ρ,4) be a partially ordered complete metric space, (Z × Z, d,4),
X,Y ⊆ Z and F : X × Y → X and f : X × Y → Y be a continuous map with the
mixed monotone property. Let there exists α ∈ [0, 1), so that the inequality
ρ
(




f(x, y), f(u, v)
)
6 αρ(x, u) + αρ(y, v) (10)
holds for all x < u and y 4 v. If there exists at least one ordered pair (x, y) ∈ X × Y
such that x 4 F (x, y) and y < f(x, y), then there exists a coupled fixed points (x, y) of
(F, f).
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(i) If, in addition, every pair of elements in X × Y has a lower or an upper bound,
then the coupled fixed point is unique.
(ii) If, in addition, every element in Z has a lower or an upper bound and f(x, y) =
F (y, x), then the coupled fixed point (x, y)) satisfies x = y.
Remark. If X = Y = Z, in Theorem 2, we get the results from [4]. We will justify in
the application section that the generalization, which we have made, is interesting when
we try to apply the theory of coupled fixed points in oligopoly markets.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let us consider the function T : X × Y → R defined by















where z = (x, y) ∈ X × Y and z = (y, x). The map T satisfies the conditions of
Theorem 1 as far as T is continuous, proper function, bounded from below, and the set
of all z ∈ X × X such that x 4 F (z) and y < f(z) is not empty. Let us choose
ε ∈ (0, 1 − α). By Theorem 1 there exists (x, y) ∈ X × Y , satisfying x 4 F (x, y) and
y < f(x, y), such that there holds the inequality
T (x, y) 6 T (u, v) + εd
(
(x, y), (u, v)
)
(11)
for every u 4 F (u, v) and v < f(u, v).
Let us put u = F (x, y), v = f(x, y) and w = (u, v). By Proposition 1 it follows that
u 4 F (u, v), v < f(u, v), u < x and v 4 y. From (10), using the symmetry of the
metrics ρ, we obtain








F (x, y), F
(












F (x, y), f(x, y)
)






F (x, y), f(x, y)
)












= αT (x, y). (12)
Consequently, using (12), from (11) we get









From the choice of ε ∈ (0, 1 − α) we obtain T (x, y) < T (x, y). From the last in-
equality it follows that T (x, y) = d((x, y), (F (x, y), f(x, y))) = 0, i.e. ρ(x, F (x, y)) +
ρ(y, f(x, y)) = 0. Therefore (x, y) is a coupled fixed points of (F, f).
(i) Let there are two coupled fixed points (x, y), (u, v) ∈ X × Y , then x = F (x, y),
y = f(x, y), u = F (u, v) and v = f(u, v). By the assumption that any element has an
lower or an upper bound it follows from [25] that there exists (ξ0, η0) comparable with
(x, y) and (u, v). From Proposition 2 it follows that (ξn, ηn) is comparable with both
(x, y) = (F (x, y), f(x, y)) and (u, v) = (F (u, v), f(u, v)), and (ηn, ξn) is comparable
with both (y, x) and (v, u).
We will apply inequality (10). If (ξn, ηn) < (x, y), then it satisfies the assumptions
of the theorem.
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If (ξn, ηn) 4 (x, y), using the symmetry of the metrics ρ, we get
S1 = ρ
(












f(x, y), f(ξn, ηn)
)
6 αρ(x, ξn) + αρ(y, ηn).
Thus we can apply (10) when (ξn, ηn) is comparable with (F (x, y), f(x, y)).
There exists n0 ∈ N such that αn0 < (ρ(x, u) + ρ(y, v))/(ρ(ξ0, x) + ρ(η0, y) +
ρ(ξ0, u) + ρ(η0, v)).
For any arbitrary coupled fixed point (x, y) and the sequence (ξn, ηn) is comparable
with (x, y), there holds
In = ρ(ξn, x) + ρ(ηn, y)
= ρ
(




f(ξn−1, ηn−1), f(x, y)
)
6 αρ(ξn−1, x) + αρ(ηn−1, y) = α
(









ρ(x, u) + ρ(y, v) 6 ρ(x, ξn0) + ρ(ξn0 , u) + ρ(y, ηn0) + ρ(ηn0 , v)
= ρ(x, ξn0) + ρ(ηn0 , y) + ρ(ξn0 , u) + ρ(ηn0 , v)
6 αn0
(
ρ(ξ0, x) + ρ(η0, y) + ρ(ξ0, u) + ρ(η0, v)
)
< ρ(x, u) + ρ(y, v),
which is a contradiction, and that (x, y) = (u, v).
(ii) Let us put f(x, y) = F (y, x) and u = y and v = x in (10). We get
2ρ
(
















f(x, y), f(y, x)
)
















fn(x, y), fn(x, z)
)
6 αnρ(y, z). (14)
Consequently, from (13) we get that ρ(Fn(x, y), Fn(y, x)) 6 αnρ(x, y).
Following the technique from [4], we need to consider the two cases when x ad y are
comparable and when they are not comparable.
Let x and y be comparable. Using the assumption that (x, y) is a coupled fixed point,
we get
ρ(x, y) = ρ
(
F (x, y), F (y, x)
)
6 αρ(x, y) < ρ(x, y),
which can hold only if x = y.
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Let x and y be not comparable, then there exists z ∈ Z, which is comparable to
x and y. Suppose that x 4 z and y 4 z. By the partial ordering of Z2 it follows
(x, y) < (x, z), (x, z) 4 (z, x), (z, x) < (y, x). From Proposition 2 it follows that,
for any (x, y) and any comparable with it (ξ0, η0), the iterative sequence (ξn, ηn) is
comparable with (x, y), and (ηn, ξn) is comparable with (y, x). Thus form (13) and (14)
we get the inequalities
ρ(x, y) = ρ
(












Fn(x, y), Fn(x, z)
)





After taking a limit in the above chain of inequalities when n→ +∞, we get that







4 Oligopoly (duopoly) markets
Cournot in 1838 was the first to build a complete model of a market, where few players
exercise control over prices and supply [12]. The original model introduces four assump-
tions:
(i) there are two players each with sufficient market power to affect prices;
(ii) there is no product differentiation;
(iii) decisions on output are taken simultaneously;
(iv) players are rational, seeking to maximize their own profit and do not work in
cooperation.
As in [32], solution for the equilibrium will differ if any of the parties is not acting in
a rational way.
Cournot’s approach is a static one since players hold a naive view that others will keep
their production and price fixed at least for a given period of time. I.e. player i assumes
that, in time t, other participants produce the quantities that they have produced in time
t− 1. In the dynamic case, each participant tries to guess what output others will have at
time t [8].
A generalization of Cournot’s model is the Stackelberg duopoly [2] having a leading
player and a follower. It is applicable when participants choose their output sequentially
and not simultaneously. Cournot’s model and equilibrium are in fact the direct predecessor
of Nash’s equilibrium point. Bertrand has introduced another kind of a duopoly model,
where firms compete on prices rather than on outputs.
Contemporary markets can be subject to different regulations and barriers. These
constraints influence the stability of market equilibrium and time required to reach it,
for example:
(i) The number of market participants;
There are various market conditions with various number of players and leader-
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follower roles. Thus oligopoly models should be flexible enough to account for
these characteristics.
(ii) The interdependence, availability and access to information;
Rational players working in an environment with high concentration ratios are not
naive to make decisions in a completely isolated way.
(iii) The price and non-price competition terms;
There are competitive advantages other than price. Product differentiation may
not be strong, but loyalty schemes or aggressive advertisement campaigns may
still affect the equilibrium in indirect way.
(iv) Consistency of behavior and time dependence of market conditions;
Companies evolve and adapt to market changes as in [9], so this flexibility has to
be accounted for.
(v) Entry and exit barriers;
Entry and exit barriers can directly influence the number of companies operating
on the oligopoly market. They also play important role in shaping the decisions
of each participant as barriers can be considered as additional limiting/boundary
conditions.
(vi) Profit maximization and strategic goals;
Profit maximization is extremely important. But there may be periods of time
asking for other goals (as in [21]). We assume that, in a long term companies,
focus on profit maximization as its vital for their prosperity.
(vii) Linear and nonlinear changes in market conditions and firm behavior.
Changes in market conditions and environment mean that players evolve and adapt
their views on the economy and competitors. To be able to explain these changes, a model
needs to allow for some flexibility in describing player reactions and goals.
4.1 Modeling real-world oligopoly markets
Let us consider a simple case of two companies with identical products. While the as-
sumption for having homogeneous goods is quite restrictive, it helps to start with a simple
model and then extend it by adding nonprice competition and brand loyalty. It should be
noted that oligopoly markets with heterogeneous goods can be analyzed in a similar way,
although with a slightly more complicated response functions.
The static Cournot’s oligopoly is a fully rational game based on the assumptions:
(i) each company, in taking its optimal production decision rationally, must know
before hand all its rival’s production and both firms should take their decisions
simultaneously;
(ii) each firm has a perfect knowledge of the market demand function.
The dynamic model is a game, where restrictive assumption (i) is replaced by an
of expectation on the rivals’ outputs. While the simplest way is to use naive view that
production will remain at its most recent level, it is also possible to impose more realistic
views as in [24,31]. Lets first consider a situation in which there are two players ”A“ and
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”B“ producing at moment n+1 output F (xn, yn) and f(xn, yn) given that, at moment n,
they have produced xn and yn, respectively. Depending on the functions F (xn, yn) and
f(xn, yn), the model can be static or dynamic, as well as symmetric or asymmetric.
To be able to reach market equilibrium, the pair (x, y) should satisfy the equations
x = F (x, y) and y = f(x, y).
Thus we search for sufficient conditions, depending only on the response functions,
that ensure the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium pair. Compared to the classical
approaches in oligopoly markets, this way has several important advantages, making it
possible to:
• to account for protective capacity in contemporary production environments, which
allows to have zero marginal costs within some output ranges;
• to assess whether marker can reach equilibrium, regardless of the initial position;
• and, finally, to assess time necessary to reach equilibrium and whether it can hold
on.
An extensive study on the oligopoly markets can be found in [5, 16, 23].
4.2 The basic model
Assuming, we have two companies competing over the same customers [16] and striving
to meet the demand with overall production of Z = x+ y. The market price is defined as
P (Z) = P (x+ y), which is the inverse of the demand function. Cost functions are c1(x)
and c2(y), respectively. Assuming that both companies are rational, the profit functions
are Π1(x, y) = xP (x + y) − c1(x) and Π2(x, y) = yP (x + y) − c2(y). The goal of
each player is maximizing profits, i.e. max{Π1(x, y): x, assuming that y is fixed} and
max{Π2(x, y): y, assuming that x is fixed}. Provided that functions P and ci, i = 1, 2,
are differentiable, we get the equations
∂Π1(x, y)
∂x
= P (x+ y) + xP ′(x+ y)− c′1(x) = 0,
∂Π2(x, y)
∂y
= P (x+ y) + yP ′(x+ y)− c′2(y) = 0.
(15)
The solution of (15) presents the equilibrium pair of production [16]. Often equa-
tions (15) have solutions in the form of x = b1(y) and y = b2(x), which are called
response functions [16].
It may turn out difficult or impossible to solve (15), thus it is often advised to search
for an approximate solution. An important drawback however is that it be not stable.
Fortunately, we can find an implicit formula for the response function in (15) i.e. x =
(c′1(x)−P (x+y))/P ′(x+y) = F (x, y) and y = (c′2(y)−P (x+y))/P ′(x+y) = f(x, y).
We may end up with response functions that do not lead to maximization of the
profit Π . It is often assumed, each participant’s response depends its own output as well
as that of others. E.g. if, at a moment n, the output quantities are (xn, yn) and the first
player changes its productions to xn+1 = F (xn, yn), then the second one will also change
its output to yn+1 = f(xn, yn). We reach an equilibrium if there are x and y such that
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x = F (x, y) and y = f(x, y). The functions Πi are called payoff functions. To ensure
that the solutions of (15) will present a maximization of the payoff functions, a sufficient
condition is that Πi be concave functions [23]. By using of response function we alter the
maximization problem into a coupled fixed point one, thus all assumptions of concavity
and differentiability can be skipped. The problem of solving the equations x = F (x, y)
and y = f(x, y) is the problem of finding of coupled fixed points for an ordered pair of
maps (F, f) [18]. Yet an important limitation may be that players cannot change output
too fast, and thus the player may not perform maximize their profits.
Focusing on response functions, allows to put together Cournot and Bertand models.
Indeed, let the first company have reaction be F (X,Y ), and the second one f(X,Y ),
where X = (x, p) and Y = (y, q). Here x and y denote the output quantity, and (p, q) are
the prices set by players. In this case, companies can compete in terms of both price and
quantity.
5 Application of the main results in duopoly markets
Quite often oligopolies are studied from market participant’s perspective. While this offers
a very good possibility to analyze what should be done, adequacy of such approach
depends on the existence and stability of a number of assumptions: information available
to market participants; short-term goals, which almost universally point toward profit
maximization; stability of participant’s behavior and strategies.
Such assumptions can simplify the analysis, but they are also quite restrictive and
limit our flexibility to describe different real-world scenarios. The approach suggested in
this paper can help in reducing the number of restrictive assumptions, while still being
compliant with rational economic behavior. As a result, a number of special duopoly
market cases can be explained:
Empty intersection of production sets – Such a case may seem extreme, but it is not
impossible. For example, if one of the companies is working at a very large scale, it
may simply be impractical to sustain a low level of output [14]. On the other hand, if
the company is too small to undertake large projects, it may also happen that expanding
its production beyond certain limit is not feasible. Therefore, it is possible that long
term contracts or technical issues prohibit certain type of actions and impose additional
restrictions;
Profit maximization over a longer period – Provided that profit maximization goals
are based on a long-term planning, it may involve special cases that aim at first increasing
the market share or preventing entry;
Different types of strategic behavior – Different types of behavior can help investi-
gate market behavior, where participants choose their production and pricing levels from
a portfolio of strategies. Depending on the reaction of other players, these choices can be
switched to match different strategy. Complex response functions are suitable for handling
such cases, while reducing the complexity of the complete model;
Leader-follower relations – In addition to sequential games of Stackelberg, the ap-
proach discussed here can help in resolving situations, where followers do not always
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react in the same manner, or can only partially replicate the expected price following
steps.
Now we can restate Theorem 2 in terms of oligopoly.
Theorem 3. Let us assume that two companies are offering products that are perfect
substitutes. The first one can produce qualities from the set X , and the second firm can
produce qualities from the set Y , where X and Y be nonempty subsets of a partially
ordered complete metric space (Z, ρ,4). Let F : X × Y → X , f : X × Y → Y be the
respective response functions. Let there exists α ∈ (0, 1), such that
ρ(F (x, y), F (u, v)) + ρ
(
f(x, y), f(u, v)
)
6 αρ(x, u) + αρ(y, v) (16)
holds for all x < u and y 4 v. If there exists at least one ordered pair (x, y) ∈ X × Y
such that x 4 F (x, y) and y < f(x, y), then there exists a market equilibrium point
(x, y), which is a coupled fixed points of (F, f).
If, in addition, every pair of elements in X ×Y has an lower or an upper bound, then
the coupled fixed point is unique.
The conditions imposed on the response functions states that we can say something
only if when ever the production of firm one decreases i.e. x < u, the production of firm
two increases i.e. y 4 v. One case where it can happen is if in a monopoly market enters
a second firm. In this case, the first player will decrease its market share, and the second
one will increase it.
Example 1 [Cournot’s model]. Let there be two companies producing a pair of products,
which are again perfect substitutes. Let us assume that the second player enters the mar-
ket, so that outputs are (x1, x2) and (y1, y2). Then (x1, x2) < (y1, y2). Let endow
the production set R with the Euclidean norm ‖·‖2. Consider the response functions
F (x1, x2, y1, y2) and f(x1, x2, y1, y2) defined by












We will need the inequality (|a| − |b|)2 6 a2 + b2. We need to check that (16) for
(x1, x2) < (u1, u2), i.e. x1 − u1 > 0 and x2 − u2 > 0 and for (y1, y2) 4 (v1, v2), i.e.
v1 − y1 > 0 and v2 − y2 > 0. Thus (x1 − u1 + y1 − v1)2 + (x2 − u2 + y2 − v2)2 =
(|x1 − u1| − |y1 − v1|)2 + (|x2 − u2| − |y2 − v2|)2.
S3 =
∥∥F (x1, x2, y1, y2)− F (u1, u2, v1, v2)∥∥2
=

















(|x1 − u1| − |y1 − v1|)2 + (|x2 − u2| − |y2 − v2|)2
3
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∥∥f(x1, x2, y1, y2)− f(u1, u2, v1, v2)∥∥2
=










































If we denote by X = (x1, x2), Y = (y1, y2), U = (u1, u2) and V = (v1, v2), we get∥∥F (X,Y )− F (U, V )∥∥
2
+





‖X − U‖+ 5
6
‖Y − V ‖.
Therefore there exists a market equilibrium, where production is x1 = 3, x2 = 3 for the
first player and y1 = 3, y2 = 5 for the second one.
For response functions F and f , if we try to apply the classical inequality for convex
functions ((a + b)/2)2 6 (a2 + b2)/2, we will not be able to prove that inequality (16)
holds true. We will be able to just get∥∥F (X,Y )− F (U, V )∥∥
2
+











‖Y − V ‖.
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Thus the consideration of a partially ordered metric space and that inequality (16) holds
only for part of the elements of the space significantly increases the classes of oligopoly
that can be investigated.
Example 2 [Bertrand’s model]. Let us alter Example 1 by assuming a market with two
competing companies each producing a single homogeneous product. The sole compet-
itive advantage is the price. Let us assume that the second firm enters the market, i.e. if
the productions are (x, p), x – quantity at a price of p and (y, q), y – quantity at a price
of q of the first and the second firm, respectively, then (x, p) < (y, q), assuming that the
second firm is smaller, can produce at a higher prices. Let endow the production set R
with the Euclidean norm ‖·‖2. Let us consider the response functions F (x, p, y, q) and
f(x, p, y, q) defined in Example 1. Therefore there exists a market equilibrium. Actually,
the equilibrium production is x = 3 at a price p = 3 of the first player and y = 3 at a price
q = 5 for the second player.
Remark. Let the two players have one and same response function. That is, if player one
has a production x and player two has a production y, then the first player reaction will be
F (x, y), and the second player reaction will be f(x, y) = F (y, x). From Theorem 2(ii) it
follows that the equilibrium pair (x, y) will satisfy x = y, i.e. both firms will have equal
production. This means that if both firms have one and the same technology, one and the
same knowledge on the market that will affect to one and the same response functions,
then the equilibrium will be reached at the level of equal productions. If we consider the
Bertrand’s model with the same assumption of equal response functions, then not only the
quantities will be equal but also and the prices.
Results about existence, uniqueness and stability in duopoly markets when the re-
sponse functions do not satisfy the mixed monotone property are obtained in [14] and
illustrated with number of different kinds of examples.
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